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MACROCOSM, MICROCOSM, AND ANALOGY
John North
ANALOGY—AN INTRODUCTION
The analogy between microcosm and macrocosm has in its time been
many things, varying from an inspiring axiom to a tired cliché, but it
deserves to be considered as something more than a pretty figure of
speech. Analogy is so rarely taken seriously, except as a literary or
theological device. Take Mark Twain’s story Tom Sawyer Abroad, for
example. Tom Sawyer there tries to persuade his friends of the truth of
the account of the flying bronze horse in the Arabian Nights. If a balloon
can fly, moved and steered by buttons—the year is 1894—why, by
analogy, shouldn’t a horse also fly, steered by a peg in its shoulder? For
the benefit of his obtuse friends Huckleberry and Jim, Tom waxes
philosophical on the question of similarity of form and principle. It is
Huck the empiricist who puts an end to the discussion, not with a
principle but with a brute fact. Horses can’t fly. It’s as simple as that.
Jim is the juryman in the case, and he is entirely convinced. All that
Tom can manage to say is that listening to Huck and Jim trying to argue
makes him ashamed of the human race. 1
Here is just one out of a potentially endless series of quotable instances
of analogy coming under attack. Analogy might have its logic, but of
what use can it possibly be if it leads to the conclusion that horses can
fly? It might be of use to poets, or to writers of tales fit for the Thousand
and One Nights, but surely not for the advancement of the sciences?
(For the time being I will leave aside its uses in philosophy.) 
I believe that the role of analogy in the sciences is indeed important,
even though it may be forgotten after the theory that it helped to shape is
finished. How it functions in the course of scientific discovery will not
be my concern here, but it will be as well to bear in mind the very
different attitudes people have had towards it down the ages. Some
                                                     
1 Twain,Tom Sawyer Abroad, end of ch. 12.
2analogies have been considered to have continuing value, in the way the
steel frame in a skyscraper is of continuing value, and others have been
regarded as disposable commodities, like the scaffolding put round a
building when it is being built. Consider for a moment those familiar
historical analogies between the Sun in the heavens, the heart in the
human body, and the king in his kingdom. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century writers, having formulated them, went on to use them to explain
something and to convince us of its truth—of its physiological truth or
its political truth, for instance. The analogies were chosen because they
were familiar. They strike us as feeble, even ridiculous, but they
nevertheless remained embedded in the finished doctrine, for good or ill.
That was not at all the case with the great analogies of nineteenth-
century physics, for instance those between the little-understood laws of
electromagnetism and the relatively well-known laws of hydraulics.
These analogies were promptly discarded as soon as the new theory was
alive and kicking. Admittedly they often left behind linguistic evidence
of their use, as we are reminded when we speak of electric currents, by
analogy with currents of water; but the root analogies are to all intents
and purposes forgotten, except by historians.
Despite some notable successes, analogy has long had a dubious
reputation. For every Tom Sawyer there are a hundred Huckleberry
Finns. Even Charles Darwin, who made much scientific use of analogy,
called it ‘deceitful’, which indeed it often is, though such a down-beat
diagnosis can be almost as dangerous as the disease it is meant to cure.
Analogy is potentially very valuable. It allows a familiar explanatory
scheme to be applied to a new and relatively unfamiliar domain, if only
temporarily. It is deceitful only if we allow ourselves to be deceived, and
to forget that it is only a first step into unknown territory, and that it will
need to be corrected as we proceed. Its worth will be judged partly by
the degree to which correction is needed, and partly by the explanatory
power of the fundamental system on which it is based, but in the last
analysis it will be judged by the success of the new theory that is
developed out of it. With Huckleberry, we must always in the end insist
on asking whether bronze horses really can fly. 
The example of analogy I shall be considering, that between
microcosm and macrocosm, was widely disseminated. It would not be
easy to argue that it opened the way to any new scientific doctrine of
note. Why was it so popular? Part of my answer will be that we should
be looking for other criteria of success than those I have already
3mentioned. In introducing this particular analogy I shall show that it
meant different things to different people, and that in the last analysis its
fame had more to do with poetry and meaning than with logic and
science.
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MICROCOSM-MACROCOSM ANALOGY
As most will agree, the prevailing scientific philosophy of the
seventeenth century was a mechanical philosophy, in which the world
and its parts—even living creatures—were visualised as machines.
Many of those who used machine metaphors at that time gave little
thought to the implications of their language. They were simply picking
up a fashionable figure of speech. There was, however, a long and
fruitful tradition of what has been called the ‘rational artist’ that goes
back through the middle ages to the ancient world, and in which the
metaphor was far from being an idle one. The De architectura of
Vitruvius was one source of the tradition: the mechanical arts were to be
improved by imitating Nature in Vitruvian machines. Vitruvius helped
to promote another idea that has survived into the modern world, and
that was especially favoured during the Renaissance, the idea that if a
building is to be aesthetically pleasing it must have ‘an exact proportion
worked out after the fashion of the members of a finely shaped human
body’.2 Renaissance editions of the Roman writer had diagrams fitting
the human body to a geometrical figure—Leonardo da Vinci’s is of
course by far the best known instance. Others who enriched the tradition
include Dürer, Alberti, and Galileo. 
Many Renaissance virtuosi had made machines in imitation of nature,
not only on the small scale but—in the case of the astronomical clock—
on the scale of the universe itself. They were conscious of an act of
imitation of the work of the divine Creator, 3 and so of a double
rationality, that of the Creator’s work, and that of their copy. This is one
type of analogy that deserves to be put in a category of its own, or
perhaps not even described as an analogy at all. It can be seen as an
instrument of meaning, but hardly as an instrument of argument or
inference. It is a pragmatic analogy, a practical representation of the
world. The copy of the world might have served as an instrument of
aesthetic or theological practice, but it did not deepen the understanding
                                                     
2 Vitruvius, De architectura, III.1.
3 A. C. Crombie, Styles, p. 38.
4of the mechanism of the world, which was presupposed by the model.
This was not always the case with mechanical models of the universe,
however.
The mechanical view of the world has a long history, although it has
been a history entangled with other ideas of a very different sort. The
Myth of Er, in Book X of Plato’s Republic, speaks of a mechanical
model of the world, turning on a spindle on the knees of Necessity. Here
is an example in which astronomy and mechanics meet, but with a touch
of poetry too. As we shall see later from the biography of Johannes
Kepler, the mechanical and spiritual analogues are not mutually
exclusive. And let us not forget that, like the Presocratics, Plato
explained the concepts of cosmic order and the balance of cosmic forces
in terms of social and political imagery, on some occasions using
comparisons with living and growing organisms. Aristotle’s comparison
of living organisms to well-governed cities was no doubt inspired by
such Platonic comparisons.4 It was Plato above all other Greek writers
who provided later history with the idea that the world is not only
ordered but the creation of a craftsman-god. Here, surely, are a few of
the germs of the idea that the world is a mechanism, something that can
be understood in the way a craftsman understands his creations. 
The usual literary source named for the all-pervasive doctrine of
microcosm and macrocosm in a simple form is Plato’s dialogue
Philebus, where Socrates says that there are four elements in man, just
as there are in the Universe. In us they are weak and impure, while in the
Universe they are strong and pure—earth, water, air and fire. Socrates
asks what holds the elements together in our bodies, and the answer is
the soul, from which he was led to suppose that the Universe too has a
soul. This is an unashamed use of analogical inference. We find similar
ideas in Plato’s Timaeus, where the cosmos is said to be an image of the
Demiurge, so that again there is a parallelism supposed between an
intelligent being and the world. Plotinus and later Platonists accepted the
notion of a ‘soul of the world’, anima mundi, and began to build on the
analogy with the help of Christian and Jewish theology. Aristotle had
used the analogy in his Physics,5 but in the opposite direction, saying
that since animals can produce motions in themselves, the same may be
true of the world as a whole. Seneca likewise argues from man to the
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5world in his Natural Questions,6 but here he goes only as far as the
earthly world: he says that the body has veins and arteries carrying (as it
was thought) blood and air, so the Earth has them, to carry water and air. 
The texts containing such ideas are numerous but seldom profound.
They are far too numerous for me to survey them comprehensively in a
short space,and instead I have chosen a few of the less familiar by-ways
of the subject. Astrology is one such by-way. It begged to be introduced
into the analogy at an early stage. It was responsible for much of that
unsystematic mass of medieval and Renaissance material that related the
human body, inferius animal, to the sky, magnum animal. It was almost
always rather unsystematic, but it was spread abroad to a great extent by
trained physicians, who considered astrology to be a part of their science
and who were occasionally versed in natural magic too. Of course, even
as natural magicians they did not claim to be in a position to control
celestial correspondences, but they did believe that they could work in
sympathy with the heavens on behalf of their patients.7
Quite apart from such practice, various astrological explanations were
offered of the parallelism between man and cosmos. Some considered
the possibility of an inflowing of material, an ‘influence’, carrying the
cosmos to mankind.8 Others had vague models of universal sympathy.
There was an astrological doctrine known as melothesia which was
much more specific, and which related the parts of the heavens (the
planets or the signs of the zodiac) to the parts of the human body. This
was an idea that was regularly applied in medicine.9 It was decreed that
no part of the body in whose zodiacal sign the Moon is at any particular
moment may be touched then, either with an iron instrument or with
medication. 
There were many more astrological correspondences worked out on
the basis of transparent analogies. Some are very simple, for instance
those based on correspondences between the various planets and human
tools and occupations that their classical characters seemed to imply—
                                                     
6 Seneca, Naturales quaestiones, III.15.
7 Controlling celestial correspondences was dimly considered possible with profane
practices, namely invocations of spirits, using engraved stones, images, talismans, and
so forth.
8 See North, ‘Celestial Influence’, pp. 45-100.
9 For a well-illustrated account see Jones, Medieval Medical Miniatures.
6Mars for the spear and sword, Jupiter for the judge, and so on. The
relationship of the heavens to mankind was often described with
reference to Holy Scripture. The twelfth-century writer Godefroy de St
Victor, for example, composed a work with the title microcosmus which
picks up Augustine’s analogy between ages in the world’s history, the
ages of Man, and the six days of creation. This sort of hexaëmeral
literature based on the Book of Genesis should be added to the stock of
medieval and Renaissance literature on microcosm and macrocosm.
Among the more famous instances of it are works by Ambrose
(Hexaëmeron), Robert Grosseteste (Hexaëmeron), Pico della Mirandola
(Heptaplus), Tasso (Le sette giornate), and Saluste du Bartas (La
sepmaine). 
How much of all this was seen as an aid to inference or argument in
any sense? There is throughout the tacit belief that the deep parallels that
are being drawn will help one to understand the unknown in terms of the
known, but which is which? The heavens are visible. The heavens
declare God’s glory. To insist that the microcosm is a reflection of the
macrocosm is to insist that man, with whom God finished his work of
creation, is a living example of that creation. But this is not a normal
reading of scripture. There is nothing in Genesis to the effect that man is
made after the image of the world. Man is made in God’s image. When
it is a question of using the microcosm-macrocosm parallel in a religious
context I suspect that this was to use an analogy not in an inferential
mode but as what might be called an objective analogy. They knew the
heavens, they knew man, and they knew that God made the analogy
between the two. They knew all three. But rather than exploit that
knowledge, and make use of the network of parallels for inferential
purposes, they simply proclaimed it and took pride in it. They were
simply grateful that God had made us as grand in our way as the heavens
are in theirs. I think most of us now will find all this philosophically
disappointing. But perhaps it makes good theology.
The celestial sciences did not have the field to themselves. The
alchemists, who were to some extent motivated by practical—for
instance medical—ambitions, and who proceeded in a largely empirical
way, had an ardent belief in the parallelism of macrocosm and
microcosm, which they inherited from Alexandrian alchemy, to some
extent stemming from Plato’s Timaeus. The supposed links between the
two worlds were certain intermediate entities and the so-called pneuma,
having nothing to do with astrology. In due course, however, alchemy
7became intertwined with astrology, regarded as the science of the
macrocosm. In this way astrology contributed a certain theoretical
component to alchemy—so much so that when one looks casually
through a work of alchemy it is often easy to mistake it for a work of
astrology. Since theology was also often introduced into the scheme, the
truths of nature were for some alchemists the first step to a quest for the
nature of the Creator.
MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM IN TWO CONTRASTING NATURAL
PHILOSOPHERS, PARACELSUS AND KEPLER
Such ideas as these were not restricted to the Christian community. They
were especially prominent in the new Jewish teaching called Cabbala
(Kabbala, tradition), which spread from the Jews of Gerona to the rest of
Spain, to Languedoc, and further afield, especially in the first half of the
13th century.10 The main idea of the Cabbala was to unite the divine
element in mankind with the world spirit, and the very language of all
this hints at Neoplatonic influences. Pico della Mirandola took
Cabbalistic ideas on board, and publicized the microcosm-macrocosm
analogy for its hermeneutic value in the understanding of Scripture.
Like so much of medieval mysticism it was all based on a few crude
scientific ideas, such as the qualitative doctrine of the spheres of the
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmos, on to which was grafted a simple
theology. Pseudo-Dionysius and the neo-Platonists had done something
similar long before, and just as in their case, so with the Cabbalists, there
was a pretence of scientific system and exactitude. The microcosm
corresponds to the macrocosm. The doctrine of spheres, of the ‘infinite’,
of emanations and gradations of spirits and angels and material things,
was all set down with a laughable pretence at precision, pulled out of
thin air. The aim was clear: it was to connect every act, every deed,
every prayer with the spiritual world. 
The Cabbala, with its strange devices for decoding the Hebrew
scriptures, is well known. Gematria, one of its techniques, was a method
of interpreting the text by interchanging words whose letters have the
same numerical value when added together. There we have another way
of setting up a connection between two corresponding worlds that were
supposedly in a harmonious relationship. Some Christian scholars—
                                                     
10 To the school of Gerona belong such masters as Ezra ben Solomon, Azriel of
Gerona, Jacob ben Sheshet, and Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides, or Ramban, c. 1195-
1270).
8Reuchlin and Pico della Mirandola are the best known—seized on it in
the belief that it could produce evidence for their faith, and in particular
for the doctrine of the Trinity, although this was plainly not in the
thoughts of its Jewish creators. It is based on faith, authority, demons
and angels, and the miracles reported in Scripture, but that is not its most
interesting characteristic. It has the appearance of analogical argument,
but it does not deserve the name, for its only rational pattern involves
words considered only as tokens. Their meanings do not enter into the
relationship set up between them.11 
Not everything in this tradition is quite so vacuous, however. While I
have no sympathy with Pico della Mirandola’s methods, which are
indeed flawed even by his own criteria, it has to be said that he shows
some originality and a feeling for the hermeneutic value of the
microcosm-macrocosm analogy. He uses it as a way to theological
understanding, following in a Neoplatonic tradition stretching from the
ancient world to medieval Islam and Christian Europe.12 Pico noted that
the ancients conceived of three worlds, the angelic or supracelestial
(intelligible), the celestial (a world of never-ending activity), and our
own sublunar world (with its succession of life and death). His entire
book on this theme, Heptaplus (1491), is a detailed working-out of the
triple analogy, on to which he tags humankind, as the fourth estate. He
thought that he had hit on a constructive argument, leading to new
results—in his case to hidden meanings in the book of Genesis, so that
he believed he was treading in footsteps of Moses. His hands were tied
to some extent, for he had to reconcile authorities—Moses, Plato,
Aristotle, and many others. Inevitably he introduced many comparisons




As every psychologist knows, merely setting down a list of names or
concepts can carry the imagination further afield, but it does so in
different ways for different individuals. Blood, red, cross, ... what next?
For some it might be ambulance, for others holy war. Parallel lists are
                                                     
11 In fact it was often a point of pride of Moses ben Shem Tob de Leon, author of its
most famous book, the Zohar (composed after 1285), that the Bible should not to be
interpreted literally.
12 He cites, for example, al-Kindi and the twelfth-century writer of Microcosmos,
Godefroy de St Victor. 
9even more problematical. There is no such thing as a ‘mere comparison’,
as long as the functioning of the terms is left to our imagination. A good
analogy sets out as explicitly as possible, for all to see, its functional
parallels as well as its lists of concepts. Only then will it have a
reasonable rhetorical, logical, or at least pseudo-logical, force. Good
early examples are hard to find, but Paracelsus produced somewhat more
plausible examples of analogy in the cause of science than most of his
predecessors had done, and they have an interesting connection with our
theme.13 Marsilio Ficino’s translation of the Hermetic corpus in the
1460s had greatly stimulated an interest in natural magic and alchemy.
Paracelsus wanted to discover new materials for medicinal purposes, and
he hoped to do so by pinpointing the spiritual forces that would make
them work. His greatest achievement is usually reckoned to be his
abandonment of the old concept of disease as something due to a
disturbed balance of the humors. He substituted the idea that diseases
have external causes, which it was his task to identify and classify.
Being thus led to types of therapy that addressed the external cause
rather than the humoral imbalance (such as bloodletting and purging had
done), he needed a theory of the cause of disease, and it is here that we
see him falling back on analogy. 
Disease is a human condition, and mankind was at the focus of his
attention, but to someone with his particular background it was a short
step from mankind to the macrocosm. He writes as though we contain in
ourselves all the minerals, plants and animals of creation. If he had left
matters there, his system might have sunk without trace, filled as it is
with aphorisms that today look as though they are drawn from a cheap
magazine article on alternative medicine. Why they caught the
imagination of so many of his contemporaries was, I believe, because
they seemed to have a stiffening of rational argument behind them. This
was presented in analogical form, mediocre though the actual analogies
usually were—they had more to do with cosmic psychology than the
cold logic of the universities, but that was no obstacle to their popular
appeal. All things were said to have a longing for that out of which they
are created,14 and all beings, with or without sensation, were supposedly
                                                     
13 Theophrastus Philippus Aureolus Bombastus von Hohenheim was born in
Einsiedeln, Switzerland, 1493 or 1494, and died in Salzburg, Austria, 1541. ‘Paracelsus’
was a bombastic nickname.
14 Werke, 10, pp. 32-4; Werke, 9, p. 293.
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penetrated by the astral spirit. Those who know what it is to yearn for
something have taken the first step on the road to Paracelsian-style
scientific understanding. The body of man longs for food and drink to
turn it into flesh and blood. The body returns to the elements at death.
The spirit of man longs for spiritual nourishment from the stars, and
converts it into works of art and knowledge. The spirit returns to the
stars at death.15 Every object has its star (Gestirn) in the sky as well as
certain immanent virtues, vital principles—in short, its quintessence, for
which the word Gestirn is also used. This is all impressionistic and
confusing, and the same is true of a range of equivalences—star,
mineral, herb, part of the body, disease, cure. It is distinct, however,
from the old astrological melothesia, in which each planet or sign of the
zodiac is taken to correspond to a specific part of the body. 
Surprisingly enough there was a scientific pay-off from this grandiose
Paracelsian analogy. All bodies on the Earth were said to have characters
linked to the stars, their quintessences being comparable with the life-
spirit in animals and man, and this made Paracelsus ask how the
physician could extract them. It somehow seemed obvious that this
might be done by solution and distillation. The methods were traditional,
but the outlook of those carrying them out was new. Dissolve and distil,
and give due reverence to the result, for whatever else it may be it is a
product of the heavens! The point to be observed is that Paracelsus was
a sufficiently good physician to judge which of his medicines were
working and which were not. Both he and his converts to his method,
however, had something in addition to skill: they had conviction. The
fervour with which their research programme was carried through was
not simply a question of rationality. It was comforting for people to
think that they had a little bit of heaven in themselves. 
Paracelsus’s methods yielded useful results, and he was a good enough
physician to recognize those which were worth promoting and those that
were best forgotten. Even then, his methods did not please everyone.
Francis Bacon seems to have feared that in linking man too closely with
the universe, and even with its inanimate parts, Paracelsus risked taking
                                                     
15 Paracelsus adds further parallels, for instance between iron and the magnet, which
yearns for the iron out of which it comes. The thrust of them all is in the same direction,
to support the idea of alternative systems with comparable cyclical patterns of birth,
desire, death, and return.
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away man’s humanity.16 Others feared the spiritual implications of the
idea that the natural world may be manipulated by magic. A man who
criticised Paracelsus fairly and squarely on his own ground was Van
Helmont, who drew attention to inconsistencies in his work and its
undisciplined character.17 From that day to this, however, Paracelsus has
had a loyal following of like-minded people, even though in time they
were relegated to the fringe of academic medicine.
Kepler
Markedly different uses of the microcosm-macrocosm analogy were
those developed by Johannes Kepler, a man born in 1571, thirty years
after Paracelsus died. Kepler was trained in theology at Tübingen, where
as a student he was converted to the heliocentric views of Copernicus.
His first position was as a teacher of mathematics at Graz, and there is a
well-known story of how, when showing his students at Graz the pattern
created by successive conjunctions of Saturn and Jupiter, he was led to a
remarkable relationship (as he thought) between the planets’ orbits and
the proportions of the astrological diagram of the conjunctions.18 He set
out his argument in his Mysterium cosmographicum (1596), weaving
together his theological ideas on the harmony subsisting between
microcosm and macrocosm and celestial kinematics. His methods are
often plainly analogical, and he is proud of the fact. His Mysterium
Cosmographicum is a treatise on the heavens in which he uses
arguments somewhat resembling those used by Plato in the Timaeus to
set up a correspondence between the five regular solids, the five
elements, and the astronomical and astrological properties of the
planets.19 He explains how the Platonic solids corresponding to the
                                                     
16 For Bacon’s and similar criticisms by others (Thomas Erastus, Andreas Libavius,
Daniel Sennert, J. B. van Helmont), see Vickers, ‘Analogy versus Identity’, pp. 135-48.
17 Vickers, ibidem, pp. 144-9. It has to be said that Van Helmont (1579-1644) was a
Paracelsian in many respects, in particular in his rejection of the ancient idea that disease
arose from an upset of humoral equlibrium.
18 In brief: the envelope of the lines joining the zodiacal positions at which
conjunctions occurred was a circle in the same proportion to the zodiac as was Jupiter’s
orbit to Saturn’s.
19 In the Harmonice mundi Kepler carried his programme many stages further than in
the Mysterium. He set up the correspondence between the planets and the regular solids
as follows. First he found for each regular solid the difference between the radii of the
inscribed and superscribed spheres. He then matched these differences to the known
intervals between the planetary orbits. Since the match was a rather good one he was
able to persuade himself that he had found the key to celestial harmony, that is, by
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planetary orbits fall into two classes, and that the Earth comes between
them. In this way he explains why man has a central place in the
physical cosmos—something his religion told him was true on man’s
spiritual plane.20 There is a conscious use of analogical inference here,
and not merely of an appealing metaphor. Kepler is not afraid to speak
in favour of an analogical method: writing on optics a few years later he
called analogies his ‘most faithful masters, to whom are known all the
secrets of nature’.21 
It is interesting to see that Kepler places a much higher value on
geometrical than arithmetical harmonies. As D. P. Walker pointed out,
his analogies here are geometrical and not arithmetical. ‘Analogies
based purely on numbers correspond to no archetype in the soul of man
or mind of God, whereas geometric analogies do so correspond, and, in
many cases, are therefore more than analogies: they display the reasons
why God created things as they are and not otherwise, or why we are
pleased or displeased with certain experiences.’22 Analogies were for
him a step towards truths about creation and the human soul. In yet other
writings of his touching on physical causes he speaks of motive force as
                                                                                                                  
modelling the nested planetary spheres on a set of nested regular solids. So far so good.
If this notorious result had been as exact as Kepler’s other laws of planetary motion, we
might still be quoting it. In ch. 15 he gave the calculations needed for the
correspondence, based on Maestlin’s work, which contained errors of calculation, some
of which had already been corrected, unbeknown to Kepler. No brief statement can do
justice to the fit of Kepler’s theory, but crudely put, it is about 90% accurate.
20 The first group comprises cube, tetrahedron and dodecahedron (for Saturn, Jupiter
and Mars), with different faces from one another, while at each vertex three faces meet.
The second group comprises the octahedron and icosahedron (for Venus and Mercury),
which have faces of the same shape (triangles), but with different vertices (where four or
five faces meet). See his Mysterium, ch. 3 (Werke, vol. 1, pp. 29-30). Kepler adds other
distinctions, even more forced, one concerning rotational symmetry about a line through
the centre, another concerning equilibrium under gravity, and a third numerological
(there are two secondaries, an imperfect number, and three primaries, a perfect number).
21 Kepler, Ad Vitellionem paralipomena, 1604 (Werke, 2, p. 92; and see Catherine
Chevalley’s French translation, p. 224). Kepler’s geometrical analogies require a quite
different sort of discussion, for they are in an important sense drawn within a single field
of discourse, but one that was not widely recognized as such. An example would be
identifying analogies between the properties of an ellipse and the properties of a
hyperbola.
22 Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic, p. 237.
13
anima motrix, a moving spirit, but now he shifts his ground slightly.23
He tells how, having realised that the motive force falls off with distance
from the Sun, he saw that the force must be in a sense corporeal rather
than spiritual; and in his Astronomia nova of 1609, following William
Gilbert’s lead, he offers magnetism as the key to planetary force. There
is an interesting parallel here with Paracelsus: shaky reasoning, good
conclusion. However much we criticise Kepler’s law of force, it did help
him with his derivation of his second law (the law of areas), the long-
term astronomical value of which is undeniable. 
Kepler is here standing at the cross-roads between old and new ways
of looking at the macrocosm. In a letter to Herwart von Hohenburg (10
February 1605)24 he explains that he plans to show that the celestial
machine is not in the nature of a divine living being. It is a kind of
clockwork, instar horologii, insofar as the multiplicity of motions
depends on a single driving force. It is magnetic but corporeal, and so
comparable with the driving weight of a clock. The planetary system is
like a clock, it is the image of a clock. The comparison was not new—it
occurs in the fourteenth century and earlier—but it is now used in a new
way, for it is more than an idle comparison. Kepler is more or less
insisting that physical causes be given in mechanical terms, with the
added qualification that they are subject to mathematics—arithmetic and
geometry. He is tacitly dropping the Aristotelian division of the universe
into celestial and sublunar, where different types of law operate. But this
does not mean that he has any wish to drop his earlier adherence to
mysticism or that he abandons the analogy between microcosm and
macrocosm.
His Harmonice mundi of 1619 still deals with cosmic harmony, as its
title announces, but we ought to bear in mind that it was prompted by a
controversy with Robert Fludd, who was a mystic of a very different
sort. In 1617 Fludd had published the first part of a massive work which
must surely be counted as the most thorough exposition up of that time
of the microcosm-macrocosm analogy. Kepler dismissed Fludd as a
Hermeticist playing with symbols, occult ideas, and words, and by
                                                     
23 This reminds us of the Neoplatonists, and indeed of some elements of Plato and
Aristotle, not to mention such moderns as Paracelsus and Bruno, whose work Kepler
disdained. But in the second edition of the Mysterium (1621) he admits to his source: it
was J. C. Scaliger’s De motricibus intelligentiis. See Kepler, Werke, vol. 8, p. 113.
24 Werke, vol. 15, p. 146. This general problem is more thoroughly explored in
Mittelstrass, ‘Methodological elements of Keplerian astronomy’, pp. 216-7.
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contrast presents himself as a realist. He believes that he has delivered a
true and accurate account of the observable world. 
Fludd, he says, uses arithmetic in a mistaken manner, whereas his own
work, he claims, is truly geometrical. The contrast is especially
interesting from our point of view, since at first sight there is little to
choose between the style of their analogical presentation. Fludd had
given a mystical interpretation of the book of Genesis as an instance of
divine alchemy. He considered the Holy Spirit to be located in the Sun,
from whence it poured out its influence. Among the numerous
subsidiary analogies he worked into his microcosm-macrocosm theme
was a three-cornered one between the circulation of the blood, the
circulation in the solar system, and the circulation of a spirit coming to
man from the atmosphere (aerial saltpetre). What he wrote on musical
harmony in the macrocosm, however, was what most irritated Kepler.25
Fludd, he says, writes as though he was treating the three-dimensional
(Platonic) solids as though they conveyed Pythagorean meanings. For
Kepler they were reality, the thing itself.26 
True to observation though Kepler’s astronomical account might have
been judged, still we find his earlier programme occupying his thoughts.
In the last chapter of his Harmonice Mundi he spells out yet another
analogy between the solar system and the workings of the mind.27
Prefixing it with the remark that it is permissible to use ‘the thread of
analogy’ to make one’s way through the ‘labyrinth of Nature’s
mysteries’,28 he reaches a strangely antiquated conclusion. If the Earth
were not in its mid-position, he tells us, human thought would never
have been able to work out the astronomical properties of the planets.
(This is almost an anticipation of the so-called Anthropic Principle.) He
adds that if there were an intellect on the Sun it would know the
                                                     
25 The controversy has attracted much attention—E. Cassirer, W. Pauli, R. Lenoble, E.
Garin, and F. Yates helped to turn this into a theme with a life of its own—but chiefly
from the point of view of the Hermetic movement. For references see Yates, Giordano
Bruno, p. 442, n. 1.
26 Non sunt illae comparatae, ut Pythagorae intentiones, sed ut rem ipsam, quinque
scilicet corpora ad astronomicam veritatem accommodent (Werke, vol. 6, p. 428).
27 It is an analogy between (a) the rotation of the central Sun that carries the planets
round by forms that it emits / the individual planets in revolution about it, and (b) the
stirring action of the mind’s simple intellection / the discourses of reason stimulated by
the unfolding of the mind’s simplicity.
28 Werke, vol. 6, p. 366.
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harmonies a priori without any effort of reasoning. Here is a man in
thrall to analogy, and still determined to breathe life into that between
macrocosm and microcosm.29 
EMBLEMS AND SIGNATURES. THE DEATH OF ARMCHAIR SCIENCE
Despite Kepler’s enthusiasm and his long string of successes, the
popularity of the analogy was waning. There is no such thing as a date
of death for so pervasive an idea, or for the cluster of ideas that hung
like a cloud around it, but certainly they have all but disappeared from
the writings of those whom we most value for their scientific work after
the seventeenth century. There was still some life left in the macrocosm-
microcosm analogy, but as an instrument for the understanding of other
things than the physical world. It was used wherever theologians spoke
of divine hierarchies, and also in political treatises, following in the
tradition established by Plato. John of Salisbury had compared the body
and the state at some length: the prince was the head of the body politic,
the army was his arms, and so on. Thomas Hobbes and many other
writers of the seventeenth century followed suit, often adding references
to the harmony of the heavens, the hierarchical arrangement of which
was supposed to correspond to that of kingdoms or empires. This appeal
to an analogy of hierarchy could in principle have been used to instruct
people in the art of designing states and constitutions, but more often
than not it was something else. It was usually a question of justifying
either the status quo or a desired system, by spelling out the
consequences of the analogy and making them seem desirable, or at least
not unacceptable. 
In Judaeo-Christian theology the analogy survived longer.
Theologians, especially Jesuit theologians, had a way of representing the
world through the use of emblems, whether they were converting the
simple-minded or talking high science.30 They saw nature as a collection
                                                     
29 There are others that we now judge more important but that chiefly concern
geometrical astronomy. On one occasion he shows us that he was so convinced of the
correctness of his analogy between planetary spheres and nested polyhedra that he was
led to reject certain of Copernicus’ geometrical constructions. There was a clash of
epicycles (Maestlin first drew his attention to the fact) so Kepler reverted to the equant
that Copernicus had rejected. This was very fortunate: it turned out to be a short step on
the long road to Kepler’s law of areas.
30 The point about the Jesuits is well made by Ashworth, ‘Catholicism and Early
Modern Science’, pp. 156-7.
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of signs and metaphors. We are reminded of the many scholars who
accepted the doctrine of signatures, and who remained deaf to Francis
Bacon’s criticism of them.31 Step by step the idea that everything in
nature carries a hidden meaning—whether the universe or man, whether
an atom or a star—was becoming recognized for what it was, a way of
getting results with a minimum of effort. Nature’s reputation was
changing. She was casting off her human attributes and becoming an
object of empirical study, requiring hard mathematical analysis.
Emblems and simple images were more easily comprehended than
sermons, and they were decorative into the bargain, but they were just
too easy. Those who insisted on accepting them as a substitute for the
best science of the age were fortunately fighting a lost cause.
———
Appendices
I. KEPLER AND MUSICAL HARMONIES
Employed by Tycho around the turn of the century, and set to work on
the problems surrounding the motion of Mars, Kepler had studied highly
specific numerical harmonies among the planets—harmonies between
their maximum and minimum velocities, and harmonies between the
orbital elements. By 1618 he was in possession of what we now call his
third law of planetary motion, before he could provide it with a firm
empirical basis. Unlike many his earlier harmonies, this turned out to be
extremely exact. He went on trying for exactness elsewhere, notably in
musical harmony. Polyphony was a relatively modern invention—one
whose importance musicians tell us was comparable with the discoveries
of Copernicus. Kepler, in the Harmonice Mundi, adds to it an invention
of his own, namely that each planet plays scales, like simple song or
monody, ‘the only kind known to the ancients’, and that the planets as a
                                                     
31 See Appendix III.
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whole play chords.32 Again he insists on the importance of observation,
celestial and musical.33
II. KEPLER ON SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION
I have represented Kepler’s view of analogy as a rather stern, causal,
view, even in his flights of fancy at the end of the Harmonice Mundi. He
occasionally played with symbolic representations, and even admitted
that he was doing so—for instance when describing with some sexual
detail how a major third is masculine and active, while a minor third is
feminine and passive, ‘like a hen ready to be mounted by a cock’.34 But
he believed that 
nothing is proved by symbols, nothing hidden is discovered in
natural philosophy through geometric symbols; things already
known are merely fitted [to them]; unless by sure reasons it can be
demonstrated that they are not merely symbolic but are descriptions
of the ways in which the two things [i.e. the two terms of the
analogy] are connected and of the causes of this connexion.35
He is speaking here against the seductive charm of symbolisms and
staking his own claim to be dealing in real causes. It was a cliché of the
age that the heavens were merely signs, and not causes, although many
occultist thinkers took a very different view.36 Kepler insists that he is
not ‘merely symbolizing’, in the way people were who associated Saturn
with snow, Mars with thunder, and so forth. He believed that he had
                                                     
32 The modern music that he needs here resembles celestial music, but does not derive
from it. To quote Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic, pp. 233-4: ‘both are likenesses
of the same archetypes, the geometric beauties coeternal with the Creator...’. 
33 Had the ancients given more attention to observation, he thought, his discovery of
the polyphony of the heavens would have been made earlier; the Pythagoreans and
Platonists were simply not subtle enough in their analyses. This is of course to take an
anachronistic view of Plato’s use of the forms, and of scientific style and ambitions in
Plato’s time.
34 Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic, p. 244, n. 76.
35 Ibidem, p. 245, translated from Werke, vol. 16, p. 158. Kepler was responding to a
present of a work by Andreas Reinhard, Monochordum, which contained sexual
analogies.
36 The idea of a real connection (occult but active powers and forces) between the sign
and the thing signified was exploited not only by those who practised magic in an
obvious sense, but by many who advocated the mnemonic techniques that linked places
(for instance in the clearly remembered framework of a theatre) and images of other
things. Kepler was perhaps not as free from such beliefs as he thought.
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found potential causal analogies between music, the refractive indices of
materials, sexual desire, planetary orbits and motions, and so forth, and
that observation may prove some or all of them in the end to be real.37
What is more, he also believed that he knew why his analogies, insofar
as they were true, were real. It was because God had modelled the two
sides of the analogy on the same geometric archetype. 
At first sight one might say that this is not modelling in the usual
modern sense of that word—as when, say, William Thomson built a
system of linked springs and hemispheres to represent the structure of
matter—but indeed it is very much the same. Kepler seems to me to
have put his finger on an extremely important point. He has appreciated
that analogies function because they share a mathematical (or other
formal) structure. Logicians who discussed analogy down the ages
tended to miss this point, simply because the simple analogies they used
as examples shared what was usually a very trivial formal structure. 
III. BACON ON SIGNATURES
After giving several examples of analogy in his Novum Organum,
mostly biological (such as the resemblance of the eye to a lens), Bacon
stresses the point that resemblances should be studied, ‘For these it is
that detect the unity of nature, and lay a foundation for the constitution
of science’.38 He adds a word of caution: we are only to take seriously
‘real and substantial resemblances’, ‘resemblances grounded in nature’,
and not those that are ‘accidental or merely apparent’. Much less are we
to accept 
superstitious or curious resemblances, such as the writers on natural
magic (very frivolous persons, hardly to be named in connexion
with such serious matters as we are now about) are everywhere
parading; similitudes and sympathies of things that have no reality,
which they describe and sometimes invent with great vanity and
folly.
In a passage written in the same critical spirit in his Historia vitae et
mortis, Bacon rejects the doctrine of signatures—he gives as an example
                                                     
37 Indeed, one of Kepler’s problems was that he was so in love with his harmonies that
when he found his laws of planetary motion and did not retract the old correspondences
his total system became overdetermined and inconsistent. There is then the question of
which archetypes were supposed to have priority. 
38 Bacon, Novum Organum, ed. Ellis and Spedding, p. 167.
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(among others) the belief that eating the flesh of deer will renew life.39
The acceptable instances he gives are acceptable only by virtue of their
familiarity to his readers, whether in everyday life or in some such
familiar book as the Bible. He makes use of the familiar and persuasive
analogy between light and knowledge, for instance, but ultimately—and
not surprisingly—he gives no criterion for resemblances ‘real and
substantial ... grounded in nature’. The subtleties of scholastic semantics
were not for him, and that was perhaps because he was conscious of so
very much contemporary scientific writing, good and bad, in which
scholastic niceties had been successfully swept aside by analogy-
makers.
It should be noticed that Bacon’s example of an association of the deer
with Saturn may be analysed in different ways. It could be seen as a
merely nominal correspondence of two words on parallel lists. The
doctrine of signatures, on the other hand, could mean much more, in this
case the stamping of Saturn’s character on the deer in some quasi-causal
way. There might in principle have been an even stronger causal
connection, with say an influx of something coming from Saturn. Just as
in this simple example, so in analogical argument generally, there is a
wide range of possible attitudes to the causal or ‘real’ basis of analogies.
At one extreme there will be the idea that there is a parallelism of names
and syntax, and nothing more. At the other extreme there is the belief
that analogies only work because they have a basis in reality. In the first
case people may apologize for their analogies, but in the second they do
not.
                                                     
39 This was advocated by Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, although Bacon is not
necessarily quoting him. Lisa Jardine, following Spedding, believes that the examples
Bacon selected were taken in fact from a work by his namesake Roger Bacon. 
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